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LABOR LAW: NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE EMPLOYER'S DUTY 
TO BARGAIN OVER JOB TERMINATION DECISIONs-First National 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act (the 
Act), as amended,l mandates that it is an unfair labor practice for an 
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives 
of his employees...."2 The nature and scope of the duty to bar­
gain collectively is set forth in section 8(d) of the Act: "[t]o bargain 
collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation. . . to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours and other terms and conditions of employment...."3 
One of the most critical yet uncertain issues regarding this statu­
tory obligation concerns the scope of the bargaining duties arising 
out of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment."4 The Na­
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which administers the Act, 
and the courts of appeals, which are empowered to enforce NLRB 
decisions, have taken divergent views of the proper scope of these 
duties.5 The rift between the NLRB and the courts is particularly 
I. Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(a)(5), 29 u.s.c. § 158(a)(5) (1976) [here­
inafter cited as the Act]. 
2. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). 29 u.s.c. § 158(b)(3) (1976) imposes a reciprocal 
duty on the employees' representative with regard to the employer. It provides, in rele­
vant part, "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents. . . 
to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer. . . ." ld. 
3.. 29 U.S.c. § 158(d) (1976). Section 158(d) reads, in part, as follows: 
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of 
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but 
such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession . . . . 
ld. See notes 145-48 infra and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of what 
the duty to bargain in good faith requires. 
4. 29 U.S.c. § 158(d) (1976). 
5. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 75-88 infra. Any person, employer, or union 
may file an unfair labor practice charge if they believe the Act has been violated. Unless 
the charge clearly is without merit the NLRB will conduct an investigation of the charge 
and then hold informal settlement proceedings. If the claim cannot be settled informally, 
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acute when each interprets the bargaining obligations of employers 
making decisions that result in job terminations.6 In First National 
Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,7 the United States Supreme Court, for 
the first time in seventeen years, attempted to interpret this statutory 
phrase in such a context. The result is a landmark decision that is 
likely to halt, if not reverse, the tendency of the NLRB and the re­
cent trend in the courts of appeals to interpret broadly the scope of 
the phrase "terms and conditions of employment."8 
This case note will place First National in historical perspective 
by tracing the development of the scope of an employer's duty to 
bargain over economically motivated decisions that directly result in 
the loss of jobs. The conflict between the NLRB and the courts re­
garding the proper interpretation of the statutory obligation to bar­
gain over "terms and conditions of employment" will be outlined. 
Next, First National will be analyzed. The potential scope of First 
National and its impact on the historical development of the em­
ployer's duty to bargain over job termination decisions will be con­
sidered. Finally, the implications of First National for the labor law 
practitioner will be discussed. 
II. FIRST NATIONAL 
A. Facts 
Petitioner, First National Maintenance Corporation (FNM), 
was engaged in the business of providing housekeeping, mainte­
nance, and related services for commercial customers in the New 
York City area.9 FNM provided each of its customers with on prem­
ises labor and supervision in return for reimbursement of its labor 
costs and payment of a fixed fee. \0 A separate labor force was hired 
a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALl) is required. The decision of the 
ALl may be appealed to the NLRB in Washington, D.C. The NLRB's decision may 
then be appealed to the United States Courts of Appeals by the losing party. The losing 
party may also indirectly seek judicial review by refusing to comply with the NLRB's 
order. The Act does not grant the NLRB any self-enforcement powers. The NLRB, 
therefore, must petition the courts of appeals for review and enforcement of any orders 
that are not voluntarily complied with. When reviewing NLRB decisions, the courts of 
appeals must accept as true the findings of fact of the NLRB, if they are supported by 
substantial evidence. The holding of the court of appeals may then be appealed to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 7-20 
(1976) for a more detailed discussion of the structure and procedures of the NLRB. 
6. See notes 74-88 infra and accompanying text. 
7. 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). 
9. 452 U.S. at 668. 
10. Id. 
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for each customer, and the personnel were not transferred to other 
customer locations.ll On April 28, 1976, FNM entered into a con­
tract with the Greenpark Care Center (Greenpark), a Brooklyn nurs­
ing home. 12 In return for FNM maintenance services, Greenpark 
agreed to pay FNM five hundred dollars a week above its labor 
costs.13 The five hundred dollar fee was reduced to two hundred and 
fifty dollars by mutual agreement on November I, 1976. 14 
By the spring of 1977, petitioner realized that it was losing 
money on this contract and, on June 30, 1977, requested that its 
weekly fee be restored to five hundred dollars.15 On July 6, 1977, 
FNM notified Greenpark that unless the requested fee increase was 
granted, FNM would use its contractual right to cancel the contract 
and to discontinue operations on August I, 1977. 16 
While petitioner was experiencing these difficulties, District 
1199, National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, Re­
tail, Wholesale, and Department Store' Union, AFL-CIO (the 
union), organized FNM's Greenpark employees and was elected and 
certified as their representative for collective bargaining.l7 On July 
12, 1977, the union vice-president, Edward Wecker, notified FNM 
that the union had been certified to represent the Greenpark employ­
ees and requested that collective bargaining negotiations begin. IS 
FNM never responded. 19 
On July 28, 1977, FNM notified its thirty-five Greenpark em­
ployees that they would be discharged in three days.20 Wecker im­
mediately telephoned petitioner to request a delay of the discharges 
for the purpose of bargaining.21 He was told that the termination of 
the Greenpark operation was due purely to financial considerations, 
that the decision was final, and that the notice provision of the con­
tract made continuing beyond August I, 1977, prohibitively expen­
sive.22 On July 31, 1977, petitioner discontinued its Greenpark 
II. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. /d. 
15. Id. at 669. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 669-70. The FNM contract with Greenpark contained a clause requiring 
30 days notice of intent to cancel. The contract also provided that staying on past the 
thirtieth day following notice would nullify the notice and require FNM to continue 
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operation and discharged the employees.23 
B. Litigation History 
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, 
claiming that FNM's failure to bargain over its decision to close 
down its Greenpark operation was a violation of section 8(a)(5) of 
the Act.24 The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the petitioner 
violated section 8(a)(5) of the Act both by refusing to bargain over its 
decision to terminate the Greenpark contract and by refusing to bar­
gain over the effect of that change upon union employees.25 The 
judge reasoned that "the discharge of a man is a change in his condi­
tions of employment. . .. In these obvious facts, the law is clear."26 
Hence, when an employer "wishes to alter the hiring arrange­
ments...the law is...clear that he must first talk to the union 
about it."27 The judge recommended that the NLRB order FNM to 
bargain in good faith with the union about both the decision and its 
effects. The judge also recommended a back pay award for the em­
ployees from the time of discharge until the time impasse or agree­
ment was reached.28 The NLRB, without further analysis, adopted 
the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and, in addition, re­
quired petitioner to offer reinstatement to all discharged 
employees.29 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit en­
forced the NLRB order, although it adopted a different analysis.30 
The court reasoned that a per se rule was inappropriate because the 
parameters of the duty to bargain over job termination decisions 
were not clearly defined by either the Act or Supreme Court prece­
work for at least another 30 days. Since FNM had given notice, they did not want to stay 

beyond the August I st cancellation date. Based upon financial concerns, FNM claimed 

. it was not in a position to discuss the matter with the Union. Id. See First Nat'!. Mainte­

nance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979), enforced, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 

U.S. 666 (1981). 
23. 452 U.S. at 670. 
24. Id. 
25. 242 N.L.R.B. at 462 (1979). 
26. Id. at 465. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 466. For the detailed list of contingencies that will end further back pay 
liability, see id. 
29. 452 U.S. 671-72. The NLRB ordered FNM to effectuate reinstatement either 
by resuming its Greenpark operations or by discharging subsequently hired employees at 
its other operations. Id. 
30. NLRB v. First Nat'!. Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980) (2-1 deci­
sion), rev'd, 452 U.S. 661 (1981). 
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dent.3) The court decided that the proper approach was to create a 
presumption in favor of mandatory bargaining over such a deci­
sion.32 This presumption could be rebutted by demonstrating that 
"the purposes of the statute would not be furthered by imposition of 
the duty to bargain."33 The economic problems of FNM were not 
considered sufficiently serious to render collective bargaining futile. 
As a result, the court concluded the presumption in favor of bargain­
ing was not rebutted.34 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari35 "[bJecause of the im­
portance of the issue and the continuing disagreement between and 
among the NLRB and the Courts of Appeals...."36 The Court 
reversed the decision of the Second Circuit and thereby rejected the 
presumption of a duty to bargain over partial plant closing deci­
sions.37 The Court reasoned that the potential harm to an em­
ployer's ability to operate freely in deciding whether to shut down 
part of its business for economic reasons outweighs any benefits that 
might be gained through the union's participation in making the de­
cision.38 The Court, therefore, held that "the decision itself is not 
part of § 8(d),s 'terms and conditions' . . . over which Congress has 
mandated bargaining."39 In order to analyze this decision accurately 
31. 627 F.2d at 600-02. The court stated: "Although the rationale ofFibreboard is 
not altogether clear, we believe that the decision at least supports the rejection of a per se 
rule imposing a duty to bargain, since such a rigid approach would ignore additional 
relevant considerations ...." Id. at 601. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. The court then proceeded to give some examples of situations where the 
purposes of the Act would not be furthered by requiring bargaining. The employer 
might overcome the presumption by demonstrating that: . 
bargaining over the decision would be futile, since the purposes of the statute 
would not be served by ordering the parties to bargain when it is clear that the 
employer's decision cannot be changed. Other relevant considerations would 
be that the closing was due to emergency financial circumstances, or that the 
custom of the industry ... is not to bargain over such decisions. The presump­
tion might also be rebutted if it could be demonstrated that forcing the em­
ployer to bargain would endanger the vitality of the entire business. 
Id. at 601-02. 
34. Id. at 602. The court stated: "[A]lthough certain considerations generally re­
lating to economics may render bargaining futile and therefore nonobligatory, FNM has 
not shown that to be true of the considerations it claims prompted its decision to termi­
nate the Greenpark operation." Id. (footnote omitted). 
35. 449 U.S. 1076 (1981). 
36. 452 U.S. at 674. 
37. Id. at 688. See note 123 infra for a more detailed discussion of this point. 
38. 452 U.S. at 686. 
39. Id. (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court agreed, however, that the 
NLRB and the Second Circuit were correct in finding a duty to bargain over the effects 
of the decision. Id. at 677 n.15. 
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and to understand its potential implications for the duty to bargain 
over other kinds of job termination decisions, it is necessary first to 
review the historical development of collective bargaining law. 
III. HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER "TERMS AND 

CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT" 

A. Early Developments 
When the Labor Management Relations Act was amended in 
1947, the House proposed language which specifically delineated the 
topics over which the employer had a duty to bargain.4o Congress 
rejected this proposed language and instead decided to use the 
phrase, ''wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ­
ment."41 The rationale for using such broad, flexible language was 
based upon the belief that "[t]he appropriate scope of collective bar­
gaining cannot be determined by a formula; it will inevitably depend 
upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political climate at 
any given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many 
related factors."42 
This approach proved to be effective as it allowed the scope of 
the duty to bargain to grow and change as the collective bargaining 
system matured.43 Unfortunately, and perhaps inevitably, the 
40. The House bill stated that neither party would be required to discuss any sub­
ject matter other than: 
(i) wage rates, hours of employment and work requirements; (ii) procedures 
and practices relating to discharge, suspension, layoff, recall, seniority, disci­
pline, promotion, demotion, transfer and assignment with the bargaining unit; 
(iii) conditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sanitation, and pro­
tection of health at the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of ab­
sence; and (v) administrative and procedural provisions relating to the 
foregoing subjects. 
See H.R. REP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(2)(11) (1947), reprinted in I NLRB 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 40 
(1948). 
41. 29 U.S.c. § 158(d) (1976). 
42. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1947), reprinted in, I NLRB LEGIS­
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 362 (1948). 
43. See, e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 552, 554-55 (9th 
Cir.), cerf. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969) (company housing); Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 401 
F.2d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 904 (1969) (profit sharing plants); 
NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Ass'n Gen. Contractors, Inc., 349 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966) (employment security); Richfield Oil Corp. v. 
NLRB, 231 F.2d 717, 724 (D.C. Cir.), cerf. denied, 351 U.S. 909 (1956) (stock purchase 
arrangement); W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949) (insurance 
plans); Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1948), affd sub nom, 
American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (pensions); NLRB v.I. 
H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948) 
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vagueness of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" 
caused conflict between the NLRB and the federal courts. This was 
particularly true in the area of management decisions that resulted in 
employee job 10ss.44 The conflict stemmed from divergent views of 
the manner in which the duty to bargain collectively should be bal­
anced with the need for management's freedom to act.45 
Initially, the tendency of both the NLRB and the courts was to 
consistently strike the balance in favor of management's right to 
make job termination decisions without having to bargain~46 In 
(merit wage increases). See also Note, Labor Law-Plant Closing As A Subject of 
Mandatory Bargaining, 4 AM. J. TR. ADv. 800, 801 n.31 (1981). 
44. See notes 75-88 infra and accompanying text. 
45. See Ozark Trailers Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 566-67 (1966). 
With all respect to the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eighth Circuits, we 
do not believe that the question whether a particular management decision 
must be bargained about should tum on whether the decision involves the com­
mitment of investment capital, or on whether it may be characterized as involv­
ing 'major' or 'basic' change in the nature of the employer's business. An 
employer's decision to make a 'major' change in the nature of his business, such 
as the termination of a position thereof, is also of significance for those employ­
ees whose jobs will be lost by the termination. For, just as the employer has 
invested capital in the business, so the employee has invested years of his work­
ing life, accumulating seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing skills 
that mayor may not be salable to another employer. . . . And, just as the em­
ployer's interest in the protection of his capital investment is entitled to consid­
eration in our interpretation of the Act, so too is the employees interest in the 
protection of his livelihood. . . . 
In short, we see no reason why employees should be denied the right to 
bargain about a decision directly affecting terms and conditions of employment 
which is of profound significance for them solely because that decision is also a 
significant one for management. 
Id. See also Naylor, Subcontracting, Plant Closures and Plant Removals: The Duty to 
Bargain and Its Practical Implications Upon the Employment Relationship, 30 DRAKE L. 
REV. 203, 217 (1981). [hereinafter cited as Subcontracting). 
46. There have been scattered NLRB decisions claiming the employer had a duty 
to bargain over subcontracting decisions. See Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494 
(1959); Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946). Most authorities, however, 
agree that the dicta in Town and Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962) which the 
N.L.R.B. adopted in Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on 
rehearing, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), enj'orced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), affd, 379 
U.S. 203 (1964), was the first time this position was clearly stated and followed. See 
Murphy, Plant Relocation and the Collective Bargaining Obligation, 59 N.C. L. REv. 5 
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Plant Relocation). "For the first twenty-seven years of the 
Act, until Fibreboard II in 1962, the Board usually (but not invariably) found a violation 
of § 8(a)(5) in operational changes only when anti-union motivation could be inferred." 
Id. at 7; Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination ofBargaining Unit Work: The Search for 
Standards in Defining the Scope 0/ the Duty to Bargain, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 803, 808 
(1971); Note, National Labor Relations A ct-Subcontracting as Mandatory Subject ofCol­
lective Bargaining, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 421, 422-23 (1965); Note, Labor La_ 
Mandatory Bargaining, 26 U. PIIT. L. REv. 651 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, Labor 
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1962, this trend was reversed by the NLRB in Town and Country 
Manufacturing CO.47 Dicta from Town and Country indicated that 
the employer had a duty to bargain over its decision to subcontract 
its trailer hauling operation and to discharge its drivers.48 In light of 
this, the NLRB agreed to reconsider its earlier holding in Fibreboard 
Paper Products Corp. 49 
B. Fibreboard 
In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB,50 the employer 
subcontracted the work of his maintenance department to an in­
dependent contractor who agreed to do the same work at a lower 
COSt. 51 The entire bargaining unit of maintenance employees was 
discharged and replaced by the employees of the subcontractor. 52 
Upon rehearing, the NLRB held that the employer had a duty to 
bargain over his decision to subcontract the work of his maintenance 
department to an independent maintenance service. 53 This holding 
was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia54 and the United States Supreme Court.55 The Supreme 
Court affirmance led to a seventeen year conflict between the NLRB 
and the courts. 56 The Supreme Court, in affirming the finding of the 
NLRB and the court of appeals, held that the employer had a duty 
to bargain over the subcontracting decision before he implemented 
it.57 The Court held: 
[t]he type of "contracting out" involved in this case-the replace­
ment of employees in the existing bargaining unit with those of an 
independent contractor to do the same work under similar condi-
Law). "Fibreboard represents the first time the court has upheld the Board position ini­
tially enunciated in Town & Country Mfg. Co. -that management must negotiate its deci­
sions to subcontract. ..." Id. at 654. 
47. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). (The com­
pany decided to subcontract out the work of its truck drivers to an independent concern.) 
48. Id. at 1027-28. "[E)ven if Respondent's subcontract was impelled by economic 
or I.e.e. considerations, we would nevertheless find that Respondent violated § 8(a)(5) 
by failing to fulfill its mandatory obligation to consult with the Union regarding its deci­
sion to subcontract." Id. 
49. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), rev'd on rehearing, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962), en­
forced, 322F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), affd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
50. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
51. Id. at 206-07. 
52. Id. at 207. 
53. Id. at 208. 
54. 322 F.2d 411 (D.e. Cir. 1963), affd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
55. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
56. See notes 75-77, 88 infra and accompanying text. 
57. 379 U.S. at 215. 
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tions of employment-is a statutory subject of collective bargain­
ing under [section] 8(d). Our decision need not and does not 
encompass other forms of "contracting out" or "subcontracting" 
which arise daily in our complex economy. 58 
Although the holding was narrow, 59 the decision generated tre­
mendous controversy over the potential impact of the duty to bar­
gain on other job termination decisions. The controversy arose 
because the language and reasoning of the decision, taken as a 
whole, were potentially broad and far reaching.60 The Court's state­
ment that "[t]he words 'conditions of employment'...plainly cover 
the termination of employment. .."61 has been adopted by the 
NLRB and broadly interpreted to mean that all employer decisions 
that result in job termination are subject to a mandatory duty to bar­
gain under section 8(d) of the Act.62 The courts of appeals, on the 
other hand, have chosen to read the decision narrowly, often turning 
for support to the concurring opinion written by Justice Stewart.63 
Justice Stewart's concurrence sought to limit the sweeping language 
used by the majority.64 He concluded: 
58. Id. See Note, Labor Law, supra note 46, at 634. 
Fibreboard represents the first time the Coun has upheld the Board position 
initially enunciated in Town & Country Mfg. Co. -that management must nego­
tiate its decision to subcontract although the decision is based on economic 
rather than anti-union motives. By its holding the Coun has continued the 
Board's trend of giving unions an increasingly stronger voice in the making of 
management decisions which might affect the employees status. The result is 
that now the employer not only must negotiate the effects of a decision to sub­
contract (termination benefits, etc.), he also must negotiate the basic decision 
itself. 
Id 
59. Id. 
60. See Note, Subcontracting, Mandatory Bargaining and the 1965 N.L.RB. Deci­
sion, 18 STAN. L. REV. 256, 257 (1965). 
A catalyst of the confusion that seems to prevail in the general area of subcon­
tracting is language in Fibreboard which can be construed to suggest (1) that 
subcontracting as a general matter is a mandatory subject for bargaining; and 
(2) that every managerial decision which results in termination of employment 
is a mandatory subject to bargaining. 
Id See also notes 64-87 infra and accompanying text. 
61. 379 U.S. at 210. 
62. See text accompanying notes 85-88 infra. 
63. 379 U.S. at 218. (Stewan, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 75-76, 
88 infra for more detail on the coun of appeals interpretation of this concurrence. 
64. 379 U.S. at 218 (Stewan, J., concurring). "(T]he Coun's opinion radiates im­
plications of such disturbing breadth that I am persuaded to file this separate statement 
of my own views." Id. 
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[I]t surely does not follow that every decision which may affect job 
security is a subject of compulsory collective bargaining. . . . 
Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital 
and the basic scope of the enterprise are not in themselves primar­
ily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the deci­
sion may be necessarily to terminate employment. If, as I think 
clear, the purpose of § 8(d) is to describe a limited area subject to 
the duty of collective bargaining, those management decisions 
which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enter­
prise or which impinge only indirectly upon employment security 
should be excluded from that area.65 
C. Post Fibreboard 
1. Darlington 
The year after Fibreboard the Supreme Court decided Textile 
Workers Union v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. ,66 which served to 
define the outer limits of Fibreboard. In Darlington, the employer 
closed his plant operations and discharged all plant employees in 
retaliation for unionizing.67 Section 8(a)(3)68 of the Act makes it an 
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in 
tenure of employment against those who join a union. Therefore, 
the issue before the Court was whether an employer could terminate 
his business for anti-union motives without violating the Act.69 The 
Court held that an employer is free to close his entire business for 
any reason he desires.70 The language used was so broad that it has 
been concluded that an employer who goes completely out of busi­
ness has no duty to bargain with the collective bargaining represen­
tative of the employees concerning his decision.7l Hence, Darlington 
65. Id. at 223. 
66. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). 
67. Id. at 266. 
68. 29 U.S.c. § 158(a)(3) (1976). This section provides: "It shall be an unfair la­
bor practice for an employer ...by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ­
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in 
any labor organization ...." Id. 
69. 380 U.S. at 268-69. 
70. Id. at 268. "We hold that so far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an 
employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he 
pleases...." Id. 
71. See Heinsz, The Partial-Closing Conundrum: The Duty ofEmployers and Un­
ions to Bargain in Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L.J. 71. "In view of the Darlington decision, 
the Board has conceded that no duty exists to bargain over a decision to close com­
pletely." Id. at 78 n.54. "[L]ittle question exists that the employer may unilaterally liqui­
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defined the outer reaches of the broad language in Fibreboard, which 
had implied that all job termination decisions clearly are within the 
scope of the statutory requirement to bargain regarding terms and 
conditions of employment.72 
In the sixteen years that have elapsed since .Darlington, the 
Supreme Court refused to further define the scope ofFibreboard and 
the duty to bargain over decisions that result in job termination.73 
The courts and the NLRB were left on their own to define the proper 
scope of this duty. The result has been nearly two decades of conflict 
as the courts, for the most part, have strongly resisted the NLRB's 
attempts to broadly construe this duty.74 
2. The Conflict 
In 1965, the courts of appeals had their first opportunities to 
apply Fibreboard. In cases involving partial closing and subcon­
tracting situations, the Third and Eighth Circuits found no duty to 
bargain over the job termination decisions in spite of Fibreboard.75 
In each case the courts relied on the limiting language ofFibreboard, 
particularly Justice Stewart's concurrence.76 
Within a year, the NLRB came forward and explicitly rejected 
the approach of the courts. In Ozark Trailers, Inc. ,77 a partial plant 
closing case, the NLRB said: 
With all respect to the Courts of Appeals for the Third and 
Eighth Circuits, we do not believe that the question whether a par­
ticular management decision must be bargained about should tum 
date his entire business based upon economic or anti-union motivations." 
Subcontracting, supra note 45, at 226. 
72. See note 71 supra. 
73. The First National decision was the next case in which the Court dealt with 
these issues. See notes 98-127 infta and accompanying text. 
74. See Plant Relocation, supra note 46, at 17-18. 

At the risk of oversimplification, the response of the judiciary to Fibreboard can 

be summed up in a·sing1e word: unfriendly. The courts generally, but not uni­

formly, have rejected Board attempts to extend decision-bargaining to opera­

tional changes other than to factual situations similar to the subcontracting 
involved in Fibreboard." 
Id. 
75. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1965); NLRB 
v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. lOll (1966); 
NLRB v. William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1965). 
76. See NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3rd Cir. 1965); 
NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108, 109-11 (8th Cir. 1965), uri. denied, 382 U.S. 
lOll (1966); NLRB v. William J. Bums Int'l Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897, 901-02 (8th 
Cir. 1965). 
77. 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966). 
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on whether the decision involves the commitment of investment 
capital, or on whether it may be characterized as involving 'major' 
or 'basic' change in the nature of the employer's business. . . . 
An employer's decision to make a 'major' change in the nature of 
his business, such as the termination of a position thereof, is also 
of significance for those employees whose jobs will be lost by the 
termination. For, just as the employer has invested capital in the 
business, so the employee has invested years of his working 
life. . . . And, just as the employer's interest in the protection of . 
his capital investment is entitled to consideration in our interpre­
tation of the Act, so too is the employee's interest in the protection 
of his livelihood. . . . In short, we see no reason why employees 
should be denied the right to bargain about a decision directly 
affecting the terms and conditions of employment which is of 
profound significance for them ....78 
Since Ozark Trailers, the NLRB, with few exceptions,79 has re­
lied on broad interpretations of Fibreboard. 80 The NLRB has con­
sistently held that virtually all decisions resulting in job terminations 
must be bargained over by the employer and the employees' repre­
sentative. Employer decisions to automate operations,81 to use in-' 
dependent contractors,82 to relocate,83 or to partially close a plant84 
have been held to require collective bargaining with the employees' 
bargaining representative. The interpretation ofFibreboard adopted 
78. Id. at 566-67. 
79. Five years after Ozark Trailers, it seemed that the NLRB had overruled this 
doctrine in General Motors Corp. GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. 951 (1971). 
The NLRB held there was no duty to bargain over a decision to sell a dealership because 
the matter lay "at the very core of entrepreneurial control." Id. at 952. Summit Tooling 
Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 (1972) was seen as a further retreat from Ozark Trailers. Then, in 
1974, the NLRB decided Royal Typewriter Co., 209 NLRB 1006 (1974), where it dist­
inguished General MOlors and clearly stated that it did not overrule Ozark Trailers. Id. 
at 1012. See Planl Relocalion, supra note 46, at 5. "In essence, except for General Mo­
lors, which the Board has sought to limit, the Board has adopted a pro-bargaining 
stance, emphasizing that such decisions [partial plant closings and plant relocations] fall 
within the ambit of the 'terms and conditions of employment.''' Id. at 19. 
80. See Planl Relocalion, supra note 46, at 19. As recently as June 22, 1981, the 
Supreme Court in Firsl Nalional noted that the NLRB made its decision in Firsl Nalional 
"[r]elying on Ozark Trailers, Inc." 452 U.S. at 670. 
81. See, e.g., Richland, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 91 (1969); Northwest Publishing Co., 
144 N.L.R.B. 1069 (1963), enforced, 343 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1965). 
82. See, e.g., Adams Dairy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962) enforcemenl denied, 350 
F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965), cerro denied., 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). 
83. See, e.g., Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15 (1965). 
84. See, e.g., Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1977), enforcemenl 
denied, 582 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966); 
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964). 
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by the NLRB has been labeled the per se approach.85 The rationale 
of this approach is that because Fibreboard said that the terms and 
conditions of employment under Section 8(d) plainly cover the ter­
mination of employment,86 a decision by management that results in 
job terminations, by its very nature, must be subject to the Section 
8(d) requirement to bargain in good faith over terms and conditions 
of employment.87 
The courts rejected the NLRB's broad interpretation and con­
tinued to strictly interpret Justice Stewart's narrow concurrence in 
Fibreboard.88 Recent courts of appeals decisions, however, have 
adopted a broader reading of Fibreboard, particularly in partial 
plant closing situations. In 1978, the Third Circuit became the first 
to adopt a presumption in favor of a duty to bargain over job termi­
nation decisions.89 In Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB,90 the 
per se approach of the NLRB was rejected but the use ofa rebuttable 
presumption of a duty to bargain over a partial closing of an em­
ployer's operations was advocated.91 Less than two years later, the 
85. See, e.g., 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 
720, 731-34 (1978). 
86. 379 U.S. at 210. 
87. See Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720, 731-34 (1978); Sub­
contracting, supra note 45 at 203. "[T)he Board has generally required the employer to 
bargain with the union representative, regardless of the purity of the employers' eco­
nomic motivation, if the decision has a substantial effect on the employment security of 
the company's employees." Id. at 214. 
88. Plant Relocation, supra note 46, at 5. "The judiciary, however, fastening on the 
limiting language of Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, usually but not invariably, has 
come down on the side of management." Id. at 19; see, e.g., Royal Typewriter Co. v. 
NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th cir. 1976); International Machinist Ass'n. v. North East Air­
lines, 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1972). 
89. Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
90. 582 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
91. Id. at 735. 
Just as subcontracting is likely to lead to the termination of employment, so too 
will the closing down of an employer's plant-and thus the latter act 'might 
appropriately be called a condition of employment.' 
Accordingly, it would seem that there is an initial presumption founded on 
the statutory purposes and language, that a partial closing is a mandatory sub­
ject of bargaining. However, as earlier pointed out, any such presumption con­
strued as a per se rule . . . . 
Id. (emphasis in original) For a more complete discussion of Brockway see Comment, 
Employer's /Juty to Bargain Over A Partial Closure, Brockway M~tor Trucks v. NLRB, 
528 F.2d 720 (3rd Cir. 1978), 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 747 (1979); Note, Duty to Bar­
gain About Termination of Operations: Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 92 HARV. L. 
REV. 768 (1979); Note, Labor La_Duty to Bargain Over Partial Closing Decisions­
Brockway Motor Trucks, Division of Mack Trucks, Inc., v. NLRB, 28 KAN. L. REV. 157 
(1979). 
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Seventh Circuit, in Davis v. NLRB,92 went even further and, in ef­
fect, adopted the NLRB's per se approach.93 The Seventh Circuit 
held that the decision to convert a restaurant from full-service to 
self-service, which resulted in the termination of six waitresses, was 
subject to the duty to bargain under Section 8(d).94 
Within four months of Davis, the Second Circuit continued this 
trend of liberal interpretation of Fibreboard with First National.95 
The court decided that Fibreboard dictated that a presumption in 
favor of a duty to bargain exists for partial plant closing decisions.96 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of this conflict 
over the proper interpretation ofFibreboard and the proper scope of 
management's duty to bargain over economically motivated deci­
sions that result in job terminations.97 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Supreme Court Decision 
In First National, the Supreme Court focused on the fundamen­
tal goal of the Labor Management Relations Act in analyzing the 
bargaining duties of an employer in deciding to close part of his 
business.98 That goal is to maintain industrial peace in order to pre­
serve the free flow of interstate commerce.99 Congress sought to pro­
mote collective bargaining between employers and representatives of 
their employees as the means to achieve this goa1. 1OO The Court, 
92. 617 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1980). 
93. Id. at 1268. They reasoned that "the closing of a full service restaurant. ..is a 
'condition of employment' for purposes of the Act because such a decision leads to the 
termination of at least some employees." Id. 
94. Id. at 1270. 
95. 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). 
96. Id. at 601. 
We also agree with the Brockway court that the correct approach is to establish 
a presumption that a duty to bargain exists. A partial closing affects 'terms and 
conditions of employment' at least as much as does the decision to contract out 
which the Fibreboard Court found to fall within the literal meaning of the 
statute. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
97. 452 U.S. at 674. For additional discussion of the conflict between the NLRB 
and the courts of appeals, see id. at 672-74; Brockway Motors Trucks, Inc., 582 F.2d at 
727·35; 5 T. KHEEL, LABOR LAW, § 20 at 151·75 (Bender ed. 1981); Subcontracting, supra 
note 45, at 213·17; Plant Relocation, supra note 46, at 12·20. 
98. 452 U.S. at 674. 
99. Id. "A fundamental aim of the Labor Management Relations Act is the estab· 
lishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate com­
merce." Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones Loughlin Street Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937». 
100. Id. "Central to the achievement of this purpose is the promotion of collective 
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however, emphasized that while parties can choose to bargain over 
any legal subject, Congress expressly limited the subjects over which 
parties must bargain. 101 The Congressional premise that "collective 
[bargaining] discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons 
will result in decisions that are better for both management and la­
bor and for society as a whole will be true, however, only if the sub­
ject proposed for discussion is amenable to resolution through the 
bargaining process." 102 The Court, therefore, concluded that there is 
an undeniable limit to the subjects over which Congress intended to 
make bargaining mandatory.103 
The Court determined that" 'the limitation includes only issues 
that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and 
the employees.' "104 This standard then was used to divide manage­
rial decisions into three categories. lOS Decisions that have only an 
indirect impact on the employment relationship were held to carry 
with them no duty to bargainlO6 while decisions that have a direct 
focus and impact on some aspect of the employment relationship 
were found to be clearly within the scope of the duty to bargain. I07 
bargaining as a method of defusing and channeling conflict between labor and manage­
ment." Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 678. 
103. Id. at 676. 
104. Id. (quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America v. Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971». 

Section 8(a) of the Act, of course, does not immutably fix a list of subjects for 

mandatory bargaining ....But it does establish a limitation against which pro­

posed topics must be measured. In general terms, the limitation includes only 

issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and the 

employees. 

Id. (quoting Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers ofAmerica v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971». 
105. Id. at 676-77. 

Some management decisions, such as choice of advertising and promotion, 

product type and design, and financing arrangements, have only an indirect and 

attenuated impact on the employment relationship. See Fibreboard, 379 U.S., 

at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). Other management decisions, such as the order 

of succession of layoffs and recalls, production quotas, and work rules, are al­

most exclusively 'an aspect of the relationship' between employer and em­

ployee. Chemical Workers, 404 U.S. at 178. The present case concerns a third 

type of management decision, one that had a direct impact on employment, 

since jobs were inexorably eliminated by the termination, but had as its focus 

only the economic profitability of the contract with Greenpark, a concern under 

these facts wholly apart from the employment relationship. 

Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 677. 
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Decisions, such as the type made by FNM, having a direct impact on 
the employment relationship, are not subject to a per se rule as they 
focus on factors wholly apart from the employment relationship. 108 
They must, however, be subjected to a balancing test in order to de­
termine whether there is a duty to bargain over them. 109 
The Court prefaced its discussion of this balancing approach 
with language that gave strong recognition to the interests of man­
agement. It stated that Congress did not intend the scope of the duty 
to bargain to be so broad "that the elected union representative 
would become an equal partner in the running of the business enter­
prise in which the union's members are employed."IIO The Court 
determined: "Management must be free from the constraints of the 
bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profita­
ble business." III The decisions within this realm were classified as 
those which are not "amenable to resolution through the bargaining 
process." I 12 
The Court developed its balancing test based upon the founda­
tion of these affirmed rights of the employer. It determined that the 
employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking was so great that 
bargaining over decisions related to job termination should be re­
quired only when the benefits for labor-management relations and 
the collective bargaining process outweigh the burdens such a re­
quirement would place on the employer's ability to efficiently con­
duct business. 113 In applying this test to the issue before it, the Court 
examined the needs of both the union and management in order to 
108. ld. This is implicit in the Court's analysis: 

[T]he present case concerns a third type of management decision, one that had a . 

direct impact on employment, since jobs were inexorably eliminated by the ter­

mination, but has as its focus only the economic profitability of the contract 

with Greenpark, a concern under these facts wholly apart from the employment 

relationship. 

ld. 
109. ld. at 677-79. 
110. ld. at 676. 
111. /d. at 678-79. 
112. /d. at 678. 
The concept of mandatory bargaining is premised on the belief that collective 
discussions backed by the parties' economic weapons will result in decisions 
that are better for both management and labor and for society as a whole. . . . 
This will be true, however, only if the subject proposed for discussion is amena­
ble to resolution through the bargaining process. Management must be free 
from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the 
running of a profitable business. 
ld. at 678-79 (citations omitted). 
113. ld. at 679. 
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determine if the benefits to employer-employee relations would out­
weigh the burden on managerial decisionmaking. 114 
The Court found that the interest of the union in protecting its 
employees from discharge could adequately be protected by three 
currently available devices without requiring the employer to bar­
gain over the decision. I IS The Court noted that the union's interest 
in fair dealing was protected by Section 8(a)(3), which prohibits job 
elimination decisions based on anti-union animus. 116 Second, the 
Court pointed out that the union could seek to negotiate protection 
from such decisions into collective bargaining agreements. I 17 Third, 
the Court stated that the union has a right to bargain with manage­
ment over the effects of the decision on the employees. I IS Based on 
these sources of input and control, the Court concluded that it was 
unlikely that the additional power to bargain over the decision itself 
would increase the flow of information and ideas between the par­
ties. 1I9 Instead, the Court feared that granting such a right "could 
afford a union a powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that 
might be used to thwart managment's intentions in a manner unre­
lated to any feasible solution the union might propose."120 
114. Id. at 681; see text accompanying notes 115-27 infra. Justice Brennan, in his 
dissent, argued that this test by its very nature "takes into account only the interest of 
management; it fails to consider the legitimate employment interest of the workers and 
their Union." 452 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dis­
sent, however, did not explain what these interests are and how the majority should have 
weighed them. Instead, it disputed the majority's conclusion that the benefits of requir­
ing bargaining would be minimal in this case. The dissent pointed to the Chrysler­
United Auto Workers wage concession negotiations as an example of the utility of collec­
tive bargaining as a means of solving employers financial problems. Id. Justice Bren­
nan, however, ignored the crucial fact that the success of these negotiations was achieved 
through voluntary, not mandatory, bargaining. The dissent concluded by admonishing 
the majority for not deferring to the expertise of the NLRB, but then, in the same breath, 
adopted the approach of the Second Circuit rather than that of the NLRB. Id. at 691. 
115. 452 U.S. at 681-82. 

It is unlikely, however, that requiring bargaining over the decision itself, as well 

as its effects, will augment this flow of information and suggestions. . . Thus, 

although the union has a natural concern that a partial closing decision not be 

hastily or unnecessarily entered into, it has some control over the effects of the 

decision and indirectly may ensure that the decision itself is deliberately 

considered. 

Id. 
116. Id. at 682. 
117. M. 
118. Id. at 681-82. For an explanation of the duty to bargain over the effects of the 
decision and a comparison to the duty to bargain over the decision itself, see text accom­
panying notes 155-62 infra. 
119. 452 U.S. at 681; see note 115 supra. 
120. 452 U.S. at 683. 
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Conversely, the corresponding burden that the duty to bargain 
about the decision would place on managerial freedom to act was 
found to be too great,l21 The Court recognized that at times man­
agement "may have great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in 
meeting business opportunities and exigencies."122 Moreover, the 
Court emphasized that the employer's need for certainty in making 
rational decisions would be jeopardized by allowing the NLRB or 
the courts, with the aid of hindsight, to second-guess the validity of 
the employer's reasons for not bargaining over the decision. 123 The 
Court pointed out that an employer could be faced with the choice 
between the harsh remedies oflarge amounts of back pay,124 reopen­
ing a failing operation,125 or the loss of the business opportunity 
through the delays and potential economic coercion by the union 
during collective bargaining. 126 
Based on the belief that imposition on the employer of the duty 
to bargain over the decision would impede an employer's ability to 
conduct his business profitably, while providing no offsetting benefits 
to the interests of the union, the Court held: 
The harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely 
in deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for 
economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be 
gained through the union's participation in making the decision, 
and we hold that the decision itself is not part of § 8(d)'s "terms 
and conditions. "over which Congress has mandated 
bargaining.127 
B. Scope of First National 
The Court sought to limit the reach of its holding in First Na­
tional by noting immediately that it was not deciding whether other 
managerial job elimination decisions, "such as plant relocation, 
121. See text accompanying note 127 infra. 
122. 452 U.S. at 682-83 (footnote omitted). 
123. Id. at 683. 

[T)he presumption analysis adopted by the Court of Appeals seems ill-suited to 

advance harmonious relations between employer and employee. An employer 

would have difficulty determining beforehand whether it was faced with a situa­

tion requiring bargaining or one that involved economic necessity sufficiently 

compelling to obviate the duty to bargain. 

Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 685. 
126. See text accompanying note 120 supra. 
127. 452 U.S. at 686 (citations omitted). 
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sales, and other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc.,. "128 
are subject to section 8(d)'s duty to bargain.I29 The reasoning be­
hind this holding, however, has broad implications on management's 
duty to bargain over such job termination decisions. These words of 
limitation cannot diminish the historical significance of the decision, 
nor can they efface the reasoning and analysis of the Court. 
The Supreme Court emerged from almost two decades of si­
lence on employer bargaining duties regarding job termination deci­
sions. The Court's holding stands in stark contrast to the broad 
readings that the NLRB traditionally, and, the courts recently, have 
given to Fibreboard. 130 The Court's balancing test approach rejects 
the NLRB's view that job termination decisions necessarily must be 
bargained over. The Court interpreted the language of Fibreboard 
which stated: "'[T]he words of [§ 8(d)] ... plainly cover termina­
tion of employment. . .''' to require bargaining only over the effects 
of the decision on employees, not the decision itself.131 The use by 
the courts of appeals of a presumption in favor of bargaining also 
was rejected. 132 The Supreme Court reasoned that the freedom to 
make major business decisions would be impeded greatly by the un­
certainty and risk of harsh NLRB remedies if the employer had to 
predict ahead of time whether his factual situation will be found suf­
ficiently compelling to obviate the duty to bargain. 133 
The balancing approach of the Court, by its very wording, 
seems to be the approach advocated for other decisions that directly 
eliminate jobs. The Court said: "[I]n view of an employer's need for 
unencumbered decisionmaking, bargaining over management deci­
sions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of 
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-man­
agement relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs 
the burden placed on the conduct of the business."134 Thus, the 
Court appears to have set forth this approach as the proper one, and 
rejected the per se and presumption approaches, for other job elimi­
128. Id. at 686 n.22. The Court also sought to distinguish Fibreboard on the basis 
that employees were not replaced and that non-labor costs were the basis for the decision. 
Id. at 688. In addition, the Court reserved judgment on factual situations including 
ongoing negotiations, anti-union motivations or collective bargaining agreements. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See text accompanying notes 77-87, 89-96 supra. 
131. 452 U.S. at 681 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 
203 (1964) (brackets in original». 
132. Id at 684. 
133. Id. See note 123 supra and accompanying text. 
134. Id. at 679. 
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nation decisions as well. I35 In decisions involving subcontracting, 
plant relocation, automation, mergers, and sales there appears to be 
the same need for certainty, speed, secrecy, and flexibility that the 
Court weighed so heavily in management's favor in plant closing 
situations. In addition, the alternatives that were found to be ade­
quate substitutes for the union's power to bargain over the decision 
in First National also are present. 136 The timing of First National 
and the contrast of the language and concerns of that decision 137 
with the language and concerns of the NLRBI38 and, recently, the 
courts of appeal139 lend even greater support to a broad promanage­
ment reading of First National. 
It is crucial to remember that the Court applied this favorable 
language and this balancing approach only to those decisions focus­
ing primarily on economic concerns outside of the employer­
employee relationship and having a direct impact on terms and con­
ditions of employment. 140 This language indicates that decisions 
135. See Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 656 F.2d 32 (3rd Cir. 1981). The 
Brockway Court held that First National made it clear that economically motivated deci­
sions to partially close operations carried no duty to bargain. Id. at 33. This is a reversal 
of the Brockway court's trend-setting presumption in favor of bargaining which was 
based on its interpretation of Fibreboard. See Advice Memorandum of NLRB General 
Counsel, 108 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1981). 
"It was also recognized that . . . the Employer . . . abrogated ongoing collective 
bargaining negotiations. This factor does not affect our conclusion. . . even though that 
factor was noted by the Supreme Court, its holding is First National Maintenance was 
deemed a broad one, not limited to the facts before it." Id. at 1072. 
In order to assess the impact of First National on pending and future cases. . . 
Regional Offices are requested to submit information concerning cases that in­
volve the issue of whether an employer has a duty to bargain over the following 
decisions if such decisions arguably have an impact on terms and conditions of 
employment; plant relocation, sub-contracting, automation, consolidation, sale 
of business and partial closure of business. [I]t is recognized that under current 
Board law, the general rule is that such decisions are subjectto mandatory bar­
gaining. . . However, there is language in the Court's opinion which may alter 
the scope of the region's investigation and any litigation which may follow, and 
which may even alter the Section 3(d) merit determination [i.e., the merits of 
the case] as well. [The Memorandum then cites the language of First Nationafs 
balancing test as the reason why the NLRB position on these various manage­
ment decisions may be changed]. The Court set forth a test which may apply 
generally to the issue of whether management decisions' are subject to 
mandatory bargaining. 
OFFICE OF THE NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM REGARDING FIRST NA­
TIONAL MAINTENANCE CORP. v. NLRB, 1, 1-2 (1981). 
136. See text accompanying notes 116-18 supra. 
137. See text accompanying notes 108-113 supra. 
138. See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra. 
139. See text accompanying notes 88-96 supra. 
140. See note 105 supra and accompanying text. 
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which focus on some aspect of the employer-employee relationship, 
rather than on some independent concern, will not come under the 
balancing approach. Instead they would be placed in the category of 
decisions that the Court indicates are items on which the employer 
must bargain. 141 For example, decisions based on labor costs clearly 
are the kind that fall into the category of decisions focusing on some 
aspect of the employment relationship. 142 The Supreme Court reem­
phasized in First National, as it had seventeen years before in 
Fibreboard, that "a desire to reduce labor costs. . . [is] considered a 
matter 'peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bar­
gaining framework.' "143 
First National was expressly limited to job termination decisions 
based on nonlabor costs. 144 Therefore, the focus of a job termination 
decision and the reasons for it will be the crucial considerations in 
determining if a duty to bargain over the decision has arisen. Job 
termination decisions that focus on aspects of the employer-em­
ployee relationship, such as productivity and labor costs, are likely to 
be subject to the duty to bargain. Conversely, job termination deci­
sions that focus on matters apart from the employment relationship, 
such as market needs, equipment or structural problems, cost of re­
141. See notes 104-05, 107 supra and accompanying text. 
142. 452 U.S. at 677. This second category of decisions focuses as well as impacts 
on some "aspect of the relationship between employer and employees." Id. (quoting 
Chemical Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971». Deci­
sions which tum on the element of the cost of the employees' labor seem to fall into this 
category. But see Advice Memorandum of NLRB General Counsel, 108 L.R.R.M. 1071 
(1981), where the General Counsel approved of the ALl's use of a balancing approach to 
determine if there was a duty to bargain over a decision to partially close a plant, a 
decision that was based in part on labor costs and productivity. 
It was recognized that the Employer admitted, during the ALl hearing. . . that 
it considered, inter alia, wage rates and productivity of unit employees when 
choosing which plant to close, and that in bargaining the Union might have 
made sufficient concessions about wage rates and productivity to convince the 
Employer to retain operations in the facility. However, it was concluded that 
such a possibility was too speculative to outweigh the factors described above, 
especially in light of the Supreme Court's broad holding [in First National] that 
an Employer is privileged to decide to close part of its business without bargain­
ing with a union. 
Id. at 1072. Note, however, that this is mere dicta from a non-binding interagency advi­
sory opinion and that ii is unknown if labor cost and productivity were major or minor 
factors in the company's decision. 
143. 452 U.S. at 680 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 
at 210). 
144. Id. at 687-88. "[P]etitioner's dispute with Greenpark was solely over the size 
of the management fee Greenpark was willing to pay. The union had no control or 
authority over that fee. . . These facts in particular distinguish this case from the subcon­
tracting issue presented in Fibreboard." Id 
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source considerations, tax consequences, and direct government reg­
ulations, are unlikely to come under the duty to bargain. 
C. Considerationsfor Practitioners 
In order to evaluate the practical consequences from the impact 
ofFirst National, one must understand what is required by the duty 
to bargain. The duty to bargain simply is a duty to negotiate in good 
faith; it does not entail a duty to agree or concede. 145 This good faith 
standard requires the parties: To engage in the discussion of issues 
with an open mind;146 to provide the other party with all relevant 
information and reasoning regarding their positions; 147 and to listen 
and give due consideration to the positions of the other party.'48 If 
agreement is not reached and the parties are deadlocked after com­
plying with all good faith requirements, they are considered to be at 
an impasse.'49 Once an impasse occurs, management is free to im­
plement its decision. 150 The union has a number of possible options 
once impasse is reached; it may accede to the change or, if a griev­
ance procedure is in effect, it may file a grievance over the change. 
In addition, the union may strike if there is no contract in effect or if 
the contract does not preclude a strike. J5J 
145. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Section 158(d) makes it clear that "such an obliga­
tion does not compel either party to agree to any proposal or require the making of any 
concession." Id. It imposes instead a duty "to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, arid other terms and conditions of employment 
...." Id. 
146. The NLRB has always construed section 8(a)(5) to require more than the 
mere meeting of the parties. It also requires them to have a "serious intent to adjust 
differences and reach an acceptable common ground." NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l. 
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960) (quoting from I N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 85-86). 
147. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956), the landmark case in 
the area of the duty to provide information. See also Industrial Welding Co., 175 
N.L.R.B. 78 (1969); Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950). 
148. See, R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLEC­
TIVE BARGAINING 481-82 (1976); c. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 271-347 
(1971); Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958), for a 
detailed discussion of the duty to bargain in good faith. 
149. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967), enforced sub nom., AF­
TRA v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968) for a complete discussion of the elements 
of impasse and the rights of the parties upon impasse. 
150. R. GORMAN, supra note 148. "The law is clear that an employer may, after 
bargaining with the union to a deadlock or impasse on an issue, make unilateral changes 
that are reasonably comprehended within his pre-impasse proposals." Id at 445 (quot­
ing Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967». 
151. 28 U.S.c. § 158(a) (1976) gives the employees a right to strike as a form of 
protected concerted activity. Id. Therefore, unless employees are under the terms of a 
contract that prohibits them from striking, they are free to do so. 
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This duty to. bargain exists for all job termination decisions. 
The burdens this duty to bargain places on managerial freedom de­
pend upon whether the employer is required to bargain over the de­
cision itself or merely over the effects of the decisions. There is 
always a duty to bargain over any effects of a management decision 
on the terms and conditions of employment of current employees. ls2 
It does not follow, however, that there automatically is a duty to 
bargain over the decision itself. 
Bargaining over the effects of a decision focuses on the impact 
of the employer's decision on the terms and conditions of employ­
ment of the employees. This kind of bargaining requires an em­
ployer to notify the employee representative that a particular change 
will be forthcoming, prior to its implementation, but subsequent to 
the decision to make the change. ls3 The employer then must bargain 
in good faith over the impact of the decision on the terms and condi­
tions of employment. The issues that typically will be raised and 
discussed are: The possibility of the transfer of affected employees to 
other facilities owned by the employer; reassignment of employees to 
other duties within the facility; the order of layoff, if any; future obli­
gations concerning pensions; and payment of severance pay to dis­
charged employees. ls4 Agreement or impasse typically will be 
reached quickly as there are only these few issues involved and the 
scope of possible discussion and negotiation, therefore, is limited. 
If an employer is required to bargain over the decision as well 
152. 452 u.s. at 681. "There is no dispute that the union must be given a signifi­
cant opportunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of the 'effects' 
bargaining mandated by § 8(a)(5)." Id. See, e.g., NLRB v. Royal Plating and Polishing 
Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Adams Dairy Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 
1965), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966). 
153. NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176 (2d Cir. 1961), rey'd on olher 
grounds, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). "The decision ... was not a required subject of collective 
bargaining... However, once that decision is made § 8(a)(5) requires that notice of it be 
given to the union so that the negotiators could then consider the treatment due to those 
employees whose conditions of employment would be ... changed ..." Id. See OF­
FICE OF THE NLRB GENERAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM REGARDING FIRST NATIONAL 
MAINTENANCE CORP. v. NLRB (1981). 
With particular respect to mandatory bargaining about the effects of a decision, 
the Court stated that the union must be given a 'significant opportunity' to bar­
gain. In this regard, early notification of the decision is essential. Quite obvi­
ously, it is during the period between notification and effectuation of a decision 
that the union can have a 'significant opportunity' to engage in 'collective dis­
cussions' with the employer and, if necessary, to have those discussions 'backed 
by. . . economic weapons.' . . 
Id. at 4 (citation omitted). 
154. See 5 T. KHEEL, supra note 97 at 145-51. 
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as its effects, additional burdens of bargaining are imposed. Fore­
most among these additional burdens is the duty to bargain before a 
decision can be made. When management seriously considers a 
change, it must notify the union and agree to bargain until impasse 
or agreement over the contemplated change. 155 The reasoning be­
hind the change must be discussed and carefully analyzed. The em­
ployer must have data to support the asserted reasons for the 
decision and the data must be made available to the union for analy­
sis and discussion. 156 Alternative solutions to the problem that has 
brought about the need for a change also must be completely evalu­
ated. 157 This process is broad in scope and can consume a great deal 
of time before impasse or agreement is reached. The opportunity or 
solution the employer needed may be lost in this process or increased 
in expense such that it is no longer feasible. 15s The news of the con­
templated change also may cause the premature loss of suppliers and 
customers and greatly reduce productivity.159 In addition, the threat 
and use of the union's strike weapon can have a highly restraining 
effect on the employer's freedom to manage and on the free flow of 
commerce, as it may coerce the employer into foregoing necessary 
changes or opportunities. 160 
155. 29 u.s.c. 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice 
for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employ­
ees..." about items within the scope of Section 8(d)'s terms and conditions of employ­
ment. Id. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962), held that an 
employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment is in fact a refusal to bargain 
and hence a violation of Section 8(a)(5). If a decision is considered a condition of em­
ployment, it cannot be made without first bargaining with the union to impasse. Id. at 
745. 
156. See note 147 supra; see also General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177, 
1182 (6th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 410 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 
1969). 
157. See text accompanying notes 146-48 supra. 
158. Brief for petitioner at 18, First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 
666 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioner). "[D)elay ... which may occur if 
such closure is subject to [a) mandatory [duty to bargain) ... and may lead to increased 
losses compounded by interim departure to key personnel; declining productivity on ac­
count of reduced morale; security problems and perhaps sabotage while a confrontation 
ensues at the bargaining table." Id. 
159. Id See note 158 supra. 
160. Brief for Petitioner at 19, supra note 158. See Comment, Partial Termina­
tions-A Choice Between Bargaining Equality andEconomic Efficiency, 14 UCLA L. REV. 
1089 (1967). 
[T)here is a need to protect capital investment decisions from the influence of 
labor. It is essential to the proper functioning of the economy that capital be 
free to flow from one use to another. Not only does this free flow of capital 
cause the economy to adjust to the desires of the consumer, but reallocating a 
given amount of capital from a low yielding use to a higher yielding use results 
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While it is true that bargaining over the effects also can result in 
delays, cause damage from news of these decisions, and cause 
strikes, the impact is much less detrimental. 161 When there is a duty 
to bargain over the effects only, the decision can be made before 
bargaining even begins. In situations wherein bargaining over the 
decision is required, the decision is held in limbo and the employer 
must wait until impasse or agreement is reached before solid com­
mitments or plans can be made. 162 Therefore, delays, information 
leaks, and strike threats make the employer vulnerable and he may 
have to forego a change that is necessary to the continued viability of 
the firm. 
Once the requirements and burdens of the duty to bargain are 
understood and evaluated, the employer must consider the likeli­
hood that he will be required to bargain over a contemplated deci­
sion. This requires that he look at more than an analysis of the First 
National rationale in a theoretical setting. He also must evaluate the 
following three practical considerations. First, the contract must be 
examined to determine whether it has language regarding the con­
templated decision. The contract can render the interpretation of 
First National and section 8(a)(5) irrelevant either by allowing a uni­
lateral decision or by prohibiting a change altogether. 163 Second, the 
in a net increment to national income and given a fixed amount of resources, 
increases the efficiency of the enterprise and the economy. 
Id. at 1091 (citations omitted). 
161. When the employer is free to make the decision before he is required to bar­
gain he is allowed to contractually secure his opportunities. The burdens of then having 
to bargain over the effects are much lighter. The delays of bargaining are much shorter 
because the realm of issues is narrowly confined to the impact ofthe decision on employ­
ees "terms and conditions of employment." Further, the delays will not cause the opor­
tunity to be lost, because it has already been secured by contract. Therefore, the damage 
that a strike or leaked information can cause is limited. The only issue left concerns how 
soon the change will be made. The damage, therefore, would be limited to a short delay 
in decision implementation. The lesser impact on management of the duty to bargain 
over the effects of the decision rather than the decision itself was recognized by the Court 
in First National. 452 U.S. at 683; see note 162 infra .. 
162. The Supreme Court in First National explicitly recognized this in their state­
ment that the granting of the right to bargain over the decision "could afford a union a 
powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart management's 
intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution the union might propose." 452 
U.S. at 683. 
163. See C. MORRIS, supra note 148, at 333. "A party may contractually waive its 
right to bargain about a particular mandatory subject. Where such an assertion is raised, 
the test has been whether the waiver is in 'clear and unmistakable' language." Id. (cita­
tion omitted). See, e.g., NLRB v. Perkins Machine Co., 326 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1964); 
Druwhit Metal Products Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 346 (1965); Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 
N.L:R.B. 1506 (1964). 
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actions of the union must be evaluated. If the union is notified of 
planned change but fails to make a timely request of management to 
bargain, it may have waived the right to bargain over the decision. 164 
Finally, the employer must consider the realities of labor relations 
litigation. The NLRB tends to construe court decisions in a light' 
favorable to union and employee interests. 165. Therefore, the scope 
of First National may be narrowly interpreted and confined to its 
particular facts. 166 The employer contemplating other kinds of job 
termination decisions, therefore, must consider the risk of being 
found by the NLRB to have violated section 8(a)(5). If this risk is 
substantial, he must decide whether the costs and delays of appeal­
ing an unfavorable NLRB decision to the more management ori­
ented courts outweigh the need to be free from the constraints of 
decision bargaining. If so, the logical decision is to negotiate over 
the job termination decision, even though the right not to negotiate 
may be meritorious under the First National rationale. These practi­
cal issues must be evaluated carefully. They can change a situation 
from one that, under the Supreme Court approach in First National, 
would be free from the duty to bargain, into one in which the deci­
sion should be bargained over. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the first time in almost two decades, the Supreme Court has 
directly addressed the issue of an employer's duty to bargain over 
decisions that result in the termination of employees. The NLRB 
had interpreted Fibreboard, the Supreme Court's landmark decision 
in this area, to say that "terms and conditions of employment" under 
section 8(d) required bargaining over all job termination deci­
sions. 167 The courts of appeals, until recently, had rejected the 
NLRB's broad interpretation of Fibreboard and concluded instead 
164. See Subcontracting, supra note 45, at 246. 
[T)he defense of waiver of the right to bargain is available to an employer under 
circumstances in which he is able to show that the union has clearly waived its 
right to negotiate based upon . . . failure of the union to pursue negotiations 
following timely notification and the opportunity to bargain pertaining to the 
employer's tentative decision. 
fd.; see, e.g., NLRB v. Spun-lee Corp., 385 F.2d 379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1967); Key Coal 
Co., 240 N.L.R.B. 1013 (1979). 
165. See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra. 
166. There is some indication that the NLRB may interpret First National broadly, 
see note 142 supra. This possibility may be significantly strengthened by the recent ap­
pointment of two new members to the NLRB's National board, both of whom have 
management oriented backgrounds. 
167. See text accompanying notes 77-87 supra. 
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that Fibreboard exempted from the duty to bargain employee termi­
nation decisions based on factors outside the employer-employee re­
lationship that affect the basic scope and direction of the 
enterprise. 168 
In First National, the Supreme Court has affirmed the tradi­
tional approach of the courts and rejected both the longstanding per 
se approach of the NLRB and the recent trend of the courts toward a 
rebuttable presumption in favor of bargaining. 169 In First National, 
the Court held that the employer's decision to terminate its mainte­
nance contract and to discharge its thirty-five employees was not 
subject to the duty to bargain. 170 The language of the Court's bal­
ancing approach and the underlying concerns appear to be equally 
applicable to other decisions that focus on matters outside the em­
ployer-employee relationship and result in the discharge of employ­
ees. The Court's concerns regarding the burdens on management, 
the marginal benefits to the union, and the lack of amenability of the 
issue to the bargaining process would appear to be the same for other 
job termination decisions such as automation, plant relocation, plant 
sale or merger, and subcontracting. l7l The actual impact of this de­
cision, however, will depend on a number of practical considera­
tions, the most crucial of which is how receptive the NLRB is to the 
policies and concerns the Supreme Court has delineated in First 
National. 
Michael P. Sheridan 
168. See text accompanying notes 74-76, 88 supra. 
169. See text accompanying notes 131-34 supra. 
170. 452 U.S. at 686. 
171. See notes 135-39 supra and accompanying text. 
